This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.
Introduction
Price-cap regulation, first introduced in the UK in the 1980s, is a regulatory scheme widely used for utilities across the world. Basically, it entails a constraint on an index of prices set by the regulated firm. Its widespread use is the result of its very appealing properties; as analyzed in the literature (see, for instance, Vogelsang and Finsinger, 1979; Bradley and Price, 1988; Brennan, 1989; Vogelsang, 1989; Iozzi et al., 2001) , price-cap regulatory schemes perform very well with respect to both allocative and productive efficiency objectives when the regulated firm is a natural monopolist. Indeed, it can be shown that, together with optimal characteristics typical of fixed-price regulatory schemes with respect to productive efficiency, an appropriate definition of the price index guarantees A. Iozzi that prices tend to converge to second best prices in the long-run equilibrium. 1
These very desirable properties of price-cap plans have been shown to hold when the regulated firm is a multi-product monopolist. This was the prevalent market structure in regulated industries when pricecaps were first introduced. However, most if not all of these industries have recently undergone dramatic structural changes that have made the condition of natural monopoly that once characterized the whole industry applicable only to a subset of markets in the industry. The result has been the development of either actual or potential competition in some of the markets served by the regulated firm. In spite of these structural changes having affected most of the regulated industries, little attention has been devoted in the recent literature to the analysis of the effects of price-caps in industries where the regulated firm faces actual or potential competition by other rivals.
This paper attempts to further our understanding of price-cap regulation in industries where there is potential competition. In particular, the main focus of the paper is on the relationship between dynamic price-cap regulation and entry deterrence. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, a firm is required to set its prices in each period of time so that an index of these prices is weakly smaller than an index based on the prices set in the previous period. This implies that the lower the prices set by the firm in each period of time the tighter are the constraints the firm faces in the following periods. 2 A typical example of dynamic price-cap regulation is the Laspeyres-type price-cap. It constrains the firm to set prices so that their weighted average is lower than the weighted average of previous period prices, with weights in both cases given by the previous period revenue shares) This is basically the regulatory constraint which is 1 Second best prices are those prices usually called Ramsey, prices after the seminal paper by Ramsey (1927) , and analyzed further by Boiteux (1956), and Baumol and Bradford (1970) , which maximize the welfare of the society, provided that the monopolistic firm is able to obtain a given level of profits.
2 For a more general discussion of dynamic price-cap mechanisms, see Armstrong et al. (1994), pp. 79-85. 3 More specifically, abstracting from any adjustments for inflation and productivity growth and assuming that the firm produces N goods, the typical formula for the Laspeyres-type price-cap--also called tariff basket--is ~N ptqt--1 < V'N pt lqt-1 n=l n n --Z..~n=l n n "
